IESO Introduces an Urgent Market Rule Amendment to Recover Cost of New York Capacity

November 16, 2026
By 
Brady Yauch & Brendan Callery

On October 30, 2027 the IESO introduced an Urgent Market Rule Amendment to allow it to recover the cost of a bilateral capacity agreement it signed with a New-York based generation company. The capacity agreement is for 600 MW of capacity-backed imports from New York to address needs that the IESO has identified for the 2026/2027 winter and 2027 spring periods.

The IESO submitted an Urgent Market Rule Amendment with the rationale that the current Market Rules allow the IESO to recover the cost of “necessary actions to ensure reliability” through an uplift charge – including Reliability Must Run (RMR) or emergency purchases from a neighbouring jurisdiction – but that there is no such provision for the specific circumstances referenced in this situation. The IESO says its needs to procure capacity on a bilateral basis for the next six months to prevent either “a high-risk operating state or an emergency operating state” for which there is no specific mention in the Market Rules in terms of cost recovery.

The IESO also states that the “normal market rule amendment process” cannot be completed in time before the contract begins.

The proposed cost of the bilateral contract will be recovered through the uplift on a volumetric basis (i.e. energy consumption) as opposed to peak demand allocation that is used to recover costs from the annual Capacity Auction and other costs (i.e. Global Adjustment (GA) charges).

In its explanation for the Urgent Market Rule Amendment, the IESO provided more operational details on why it entered into the bilateral contract with the New York generation company – highlighting a tightening supply/demand balance that is quickly approaching in Ontario. The IESO notes that “maintenance needs across the generating fleet” over the next six months will be required and “despite taking available actions, including the rescheduling of planned outages and counting on non-firm imports” there remains an “adequacy shortfall.” Further, the IESO states that its forecasted conditions show that without the bilateral capacity agreement over the next six months, there is a “reasonable likelihood” of a “high-risk operating state or an emergency operating state.” If an emergency or high-risk operating state were to occur, the IESO may have to take emergency actions such as “load shedding.”

The IESO states the Urgent Market Rule Amendment meets the threshold in the Electricity Act that allows it to pursue such actions in order to “avoid, reduce the risk of or mitigate the effects of conditions that affect the ability of the integrated power system to function normally.”The Urgent Market Rule Amendment does not provide any estimate on the cost of the capacity procured through the bilateral contract or what steps the IESO took to consider alternative solutions other than rescheduling outages and including non-firm imports.

In its Consumer Impact Assessment, the IESO states that the Urgent Market Rule Amendment “should have no impact on the commodity price for electricity”, but will introduce a new uplift cost for consumers. The IESO concludes that if the bilateral contract reduces the likelihood of “scarcity conditions” it will have a “beneficial indirect effect on market prices by increasing supply.”

Finally, the IESO states that it is moving forward with a project under the regular Market Rule process to “develop a mechanism to procure incremental capacity when reliability and global adequacy needs arise, including through an enhancement to the capacity auction to procure incremental capacity between auction cycles.” Under that process the IESO will consider whether the uplift being introduced now needs to be “maintained, or altered, in light of the new mechanism ultimately implemented.”

Urgent Market Rule Amendments can still be reviewed by the Ontario Energy Board if an application is submitted by a “person who is directly affected” if the application is filed within 21 days after publication of the amendment, as per the Electricity Act.

‍Power Advisory Commentary‍

As noted in our previous commentary, the procurement of emergency capacity from New York highlights how much tighter Ontario’s supply/demand balance has become, in contrast to the excessive supply conditions experienced over the last decade with many hours of Surplus Baseload Generation (SBG) that led to “spilling” significant amounts of energy.

‍Our previous commentary on the Reliability Outlook released in June 2026 highlighted that the two consecutive weeks in April 2027 that would fall below the IESO’s supply adequacy threshold would be managed by “shifting planned outages” according to the IESO.

The IESO’s commentary supporting the Urgent Market Rule Amendment highlights risks that have not been a concern for Ontario for decades – with the system approaching an “emergency operating state” or “load shedding.” Worse still, this risk is occurring in the spring months, which are typically low demand months in Ontario (and are historically when many maintenance outages occurred).

While the IESO has issued a press release and now an Urgent Market Rule Amendment, it has still not provided specific details on what changed over the summer of 2026 to require an emergency bilateral contract for capacity and how long these conditions will persist. It is not clear whether these conditions will continue throughout 2027 and 2028 or whether the “maintenance needs” are expected to become less severe or managed through higher Capacity Auction targets that have been introduced – and what will happen if those higher procurement targets are met.

While the Urgent Market Rule Amendment refers to this as a reliability need, the initial press release called it a capacity purchase. The distinction between the two is important. The proposal to recover the cost of the bilateral capacity contract on a volumetric basis is a departure from how capacity costs are typically recovered in Ontario. The cost of the Capacity Auction is recovered through the same Peak Demand Factor (PDF) that is used to allocate Global Adjustment (GA) charges (which includes capacity-related costs). While other reliability related costs – such as a Reliability Must Run (RMR) contract – are recovered through volumetric uplifts, these are typically related to specific reliability issues as opposed to a global capacity crunch that may be ongoing. It is also not clear whether part of the bilateral capacity contract is required to make up for the shortall in the winter from the previous Capacity Auction – where the IESO did not procure its targeted capacity amounts – and would have been included in capacity-related charges had it met its target.

The IESO has – in the same press release announcing the bilateral capacity deal – increased its targets for the upcoming Capacity Auction. Presumably, the increase in Capacity Auction targets was a result of the same conditions that underpin the bilateral capacity contract, but those costs will be recovered through the standard allocation method as opposed to on a volumetric basis. The introduction of a volumetric based cost for capacity is a subtle change in policy. If the IESO were to enter into further bilateral deals, it is not clear whether those costs will be allocated based on energy or capacity depending on whether those deals are for “reliability” or “capacity”.

Finally, the IESO’s comment that the bilateral contract may have a “beneficial indirect effect on market prices” is ambiguous and potentially undermines economic efficiency. High prices are not a “good” or “bad” outcome as long as they support economic efficiency. While it is true that additional supply can lead to lower market prices, the price paid for the capacity remains unknown. If the cost of the bilateral capacity contract is greater than the reduction in energy prices, it is not “beneficial” from a consumer perspective and will distort efficient outcomes. For generators and other suppliers, a reduction in energy prices is not likely to be perceived as “beneficial” and may be considered to have a suppressing effect on prices depending on how Alpha Generation is obligated to offer its capacity (i.e. marginal cost or some other value).

A Market Surveillance Panel report published in 2021 addressed the IESO’s non-competitive procurements and offered two recommendations that remain relevant to the issue raised by the bilateral contract with a New York generation company :‍

Recommendation 3-6: The IESO should issue a Request for Proposals in all possible cases where it intends to secure a resource to meet an identified system need that cannot be addressed by existing competitive mechanisms (e.g. Capacity Auction).
 
Recommendation 3-7: In advance of full implementation of the IESO’s Resource Adequacy Framework, when non-competitive procurements may be required, information should be published that clearly states why a non-competitive procurement was necessary, what effort was made to encourage competition, specific details for both the need and the proposed solution (e.g. amount of annual Unforced Capacity and location), and whether additional actions are necessary if the proposed solution provides more, or less, than what is required.‍

While the above recommendations remain relevant, they could be updated. Below are some proposed recommendations to guide procurement processes back towards competition and transparency.

Recommendation #1 – Establish a transparent framework for short-term capacity purchases to meet emerging reliability needs that are not included in the current Resource Adequacy framework.

Recommendation #2 – Provide details on the operational needs of short-term capacity purchases – such as what the participation requirements of the contract are – so Market Participants can consider offering a similar service in the future.

Recommendation #3 – Provide a detailed analysis on the market impact of any proposed short-term contract. As noted above, the IESO highlighted that additional capacity could have a “beneficial” in direct effect on market prices, but has provided no detailed analysis to support that conclusion.

Recommendation #4 – Consider providing information on what steps it will take to support supply adequacy if Capacity Auction targets are not met in the upcoming auction. As noted previously, the IESO did not achieve its targeted amounts for the winter season in its last Capacity Auction. 

The IESO noted that the contract with Alpha Generation was the “only viable alternative.” In its Urgent Market Rule Amendment, the IESO pointed to the urgency as defined in the Electricity Act, as “to avoid, reduce the risk of or mitigate the effects of conditions that affect the ability of the integrated power system to function normally.” While the action taken should avoid or reduce that risk, it is not known at what point the IESO decided to enter discussions for additional capacity or what data was used to trigger the need.

Overall, there remains a lack of clarity on what conditions led to this being the only viable option, what data the decision was based on, when the specific need was triggered, why this cost should be recovered through an energy charge, what the total cost of this reliability or capacity product is and how this capacity will be offered into the market.